Directed Trusts and Divided Responsibility
A directed trust separates the person who holds the property from the person who decides what to do with it. The separation reduces the trustee's duty without eliminating it, and the residue is where the litigation happens.

The rule in short
In a directed trust the instrument gives a third party, commonly called a trust director or adviser, power over a defined function such as investments or distributions. The directed trustee holds the property and executes directions. Statutes relieve that trustee of the duty to monitor or second-guess the director within the scope of the power, but retain a residual duty that varies by state. The director owes fiduciary duties of its own.
A directed trust separates the person who holds the property from the person who decides what to do with it. The instrument names a trustee to take title, keep records and execute transactions, and names a director, sometimes called an adviser or protector, to hold authority over a defined function. Investments and discretionary distributions are the two functions most often separated, and closely held business interests are the asset that most often prompts the arrangement.
What the structure does
The purpose is to place a decision with the person best positioned to make it while leaving custody and administration with an institution equipped for that work. A family that wants a corporate trustee's recordkeeping but not its investment policy can keep investment authority with a family member or an outside manager. A trust holding a family business can keep the retention decision with someone who understands the business rather than with a trustee whose diversification duty would otherwise compel a sale.
The arrangement is created by the settlor and cannot be revoked by the trustee. That is the structural difference from delegation, where the trustee chooses the agent, sets the scope and may terminate the relationship. In a directed trust the trustee has no such control, and the statutes respond by reducing the trustee's duty in proportion to the authority removed.
The director's own duties
A person who holds a power to direct the trustee is, in most states, presumptively a fiduciary. The presumption carries with it an obligation to act in good faith with regard to the purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries, and liability for a breach of that obligation. The uniform act goes further and applies to a trust director the same fiduciary duty and liability that a sole trustee would have in a like position, adjusted for the scope of the power.
Duties follow the function. An investment director owes the duties an investing trustee would owe, including diversification unless the instrument displaces it, and a distribution director owes the duties attached to discretionary distributions, including impartiality among the eligible recipients. What the director does not acquire is the administrative apparatus of trusteeship, so the director does not hold title, does not sign returns and does not account.
Two carve-outs recur. A power held by a beneficiary over distributions to that beneficiary is often treated as personal rather than fiduciary, on the ground that the settlor cannot have intended the holder to act against their own interest. And a power reserved by the settlor over a revocable trust is generally not fiduciary, because the settlor is the sole party whose interests matter while the trust remains revocable.
Every dispute about a directed trust starts by mapping the language of the instrument onto the transaction. A director with authority over investments has no authority over distributions, and a trustee who followed a distribution instruction from an investment director followed no direction at all. Ambiguous grants are construed against the party asserting relief from duty, which in practice means against the trustee.
What the trustee still owes
Within the director's scope, the statutes relieve the trustee of the duties that would otherwise apply. The excluded trustee has no duty to review the director's decisions, no duty to make recommendations, and no liability for loss resulting from compliance with an authorized direction or from failing to act where a required authorization was sought and not given. That is a substantial reduction, and it is what makes institutions willing to serve.
What remains varies more than practitioners expect. Some states preserve liability only for the trustee's own willful misconduct. Others use gross negligence. The uniform act imposes a duty to take reasonable action to avoid serious breaches of trust of which the trustee has actual knowledge, and a duty not to participate willfully in a breach. Under any of these formulations the trustee cannot execute an instruction it actually knows to be a serious breach, and the difference between formulations is largely about how much less than actual knowledge will suffice.
Outside the director's scope, nothing changes. The trustee remains bound to keep adequate records, to keep trust property separate, to make required distributions, to file returns, and to keep the beneficiaries informed. A directed trustee that treats the structure as relieving it of administrative obligations has misread the statute, and that misreading is the source of a large share of directed trust litigation.
| Function | Directed trust | Delegation by trustee | Undivided trusteeship |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who chooses the decision maker | The settlor, in the instrument | The trustee, by contract | Not applicable |
| Trustee's monitoring duty | None within the director's scope | Continuing and periodic | Full prudent investor duty |
| Trustee's residual exposure | Willful misconduct or gross negligence, by state | Care in selection, scope and review | The whole standard |
| Decision maker's duty to beneficiaries | Fiduciary, presumptively | Reasonable care under the delegation | Fiduciary |
| Who reports and accounts | The trustee | The trustee | The trustee |
Information flow is the practical mechanism that makes any of this work. The trustee holds the records and the director makes the decisions, so each depends on the other. Most statutes impose reciprocal duties to provide information reasonably related to the other's function, and instruments that omit such a provision leave a director working without custodial data and a trustee reporting transactions it cannot explain.
Where the structure fails in practice
Compensation is a further practical wrinkle. A directed trustee performing narrower work usually charges less than a full-service trustee, but the director's fee is layered on top, and the combined cost can exceed what a single trustee would have charged. The instrument rarely addresses how the two fees interact, and beneficiaries reviewing the total sometimes discover that the structure they were told would save money has done the opposite.
Three failures recur. The first is a gap: an instrument that removes investment authority from the trustee without clearly conferring it on anyone, leaving a portfolio nobody is responsible for. The second is a director who stops acting, through death, incapacity or simple disengagement, with no successor mechanism in the instrument. A trustee facing an unresponsive director should seek instructions from a court rather than assume the authority reverts.
The third is a choice-of-law mismatch. Directed trust protections differ sharply between states, and a trust administered in one state under the law of another can find that the protection assumed to apply does not. That question is worth resolving before a dispute rather than after, and where the answer is unfavorable the structural fixes described in decanting, consent and changed circumstances may be available.
None of these problems change the trustee's reporting position. Beneficiaries evaluating a directed portfolio still receive the annual accounting from the trustee, and still hold the entitlements described in the duty to inform and report to beneficiaries. Where a director's conduct is challenged, the measure of any recovery is the one described in surcharge for losses and how it is measured, applied to the director in the capacity the instrument created.
Points to carry away
- A trust director holds a power over a specified function granted by the terms of the trust rather than by contract.
- A person holding a power to direct is presumptively a fiduciary who must act in good faith with regard to the purposes of the trust.
- The directed trustee is relieved of the duty to review or recommend within the director's scope, but not of every duty.
- The residual standard differs by state, from willful misconduct through gross negligence to a duty to act on actual knowledge of a serious breach.
- Directed structures do not divide the duties owed to beneficiaries for information, recordkeeping and accounting, which remain with the trustee.
Questions readers ask
How does a directed trust differ from delegation?
Delegation is an act of the trustee, made by contract and revocable by the trustee, and it leaves the trustee with duties of selection, scope-setting and monitoring. A directed structure is created by the settlor in the instrument, and the trustee cannot revoke it or override the director. The practical consequence is where the residual risk sits. A delegating trustee is exposed on the monitoring duty. A directed trustee is exposed only within whatever residual standard the governing statute preserves, which is generally narrower.
Can the same person be both a director and a beneficiary?
Statutes generally permit it, and instruments frequently do it, most often by giving an adult beneficiary power to direct investments. Several consequences follow. A beneficiary exercising a power in that beneficiary's own favor may be treated as holding a personal rather than a fiduciary power, which alters the standard of review. There can also be tax and creditor consequences where a beneficiary holds a power over distributions to that beneficiary, which is why such powers are usually limited by an ascertainable standard.
Who accounts to the beneficiaries in a directed trust?
The trustee. The information and reporting duties are not divided by the directed structure, because the trustee holds the property and the records. A trustee whose portfolio is managed on direction must still report the holdings, the transactions and the values, and must still respond to a beneficiary's request for information reasonably related to the administration. Where the information sought concerns the director's reasoning, the trustee's obligation is generally to supply what it has rather than to compel the director to explain.
Sources
- Ohio Revised Code § 5808.08 — Direction of settlor contrary to terms; power of modificationTreats a holder of a power to direct as presumptively a fiduciary owing good faith to the trust.
- Ohio Revised Code § 5815.25 — Administrative duties; exclusion of fiduciariesRelieves an excluded fiduciary of loss from compliance with an authorized direction.
- Uniform Law Commission — Directed Trust ActThe model act defining trust directors, their duties and the directed trustee's residual obligations.
- Ohio Revised Code § 5809.06 — Delegation of investment and management functionsProvides the contrasting delegation regime with its monitoring duty.
- Ohio Revised Code § 5808.13 — Keeping beneficiaries informed; required reportsConfirms that information and reporting duties stay with the trustee regardless of direction.
- Uniform Law Commission — Prudent Investor ActThe default investment standard a directed structure displaces within the director's scope.
Pinnacle Law Review is a publication, not a law firm. This article states general rules and cites its sources; it is not advice about any particular case, and the law differs by state and changes over time.
More in Trusts & Fiduciaries
Investing Under the Prudent Investor Standard
A trustee must invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements and other circumstances of the trust. Individual holdings are not evaluated in isolation but as part of an overall strategy with risk and return objectives suited to the trust. Diversification is required unless special circumstances make the trust better served without it. Delegation is permitted where the trustee takes care in selecting and monitoring the agent.
Removing a Trustee
A settlor, cotrustee or beneficiary may ask a court to remove a trustee, and a court may act on its own initiative. The statutory grounds are a serious breach of trust, a lack of cooperation among cotrustees that substantially impairs administration, unfitness or persistent failure to administer effectively, and in most states a substantial change of circumstances or a request by all qualified beneficiaries. The last grounds also require a suitable successor.
Self-Dealing and the No-Further-Inquiry Rule
A trustee must administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries. A sale, encumbrance or other transaction involving trust property entered into by the trustee for the trustee's own account, or otherwise affected by a conflict between fiduciary and personal interests, is voidable by an affected beneficiary. Proof that the price was fair does not save it. The exceptions are narrow and specific.


